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Perhaps no legal principle illustrates the use of Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection jurisprudence more poignantly than the relatively obscure cy pres
doctrine. The ancient doctrine which allowed both courts and the Crown in England
to change trust purposes when the original trust purposes proved no longer viable
was adopted belatedly, sporadically and partially by jurisdictions in the United
States.2 Although use of the doctrine was meager in the 19th century,3 use increased

1

Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law, North Dartmouth,
Massachusetts; B.A., Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas; J.D., University of
Arkansas School of Law; M.A., Ph.D., History, University of Arkansas. The author wishes to
acknowledge the late Professor George W. Keeton (1902-1989), Gray’s Inn, for sparking
interest in the complex Law of Trusts and the dynamic world of legal history.
2
Justice Taney, concurring in William Fontain, Administrator of Frederick Kohne v.
William Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369 (Mem.), 17 How. 369, 15 L.Ed. 80 (1854), noted the differences
of opinion in the few Supreme Court cases that had considered whether the doctrine had been
adopted as part of the common law. Taney's conclusion highlights the difficulty the early
courts had with the question of jurisdiction and of reception relating to the doctrine of cy pres,
"I think I can safely conclude that the power exercised by the English court of chancery 'in
enforcing donations to charitable uses,' is not a part of its jurisdiction as a court of equity, but
a prerogative power exercised by that court." Id. at 392-94. The majority denied the
application of cy pres, noting, "The chancery powers are of comparatively recent
establishment in the State of Pennsylvania, and it does not appear that the cy pres power is
given, and in the exercise of jurisdiction it seems to be disclaimed." Id. at 389.
3
In 1867, the Massachusetts court noted the refusal to adopt the doctrine by Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Connecticut and Illinois;
its restricted acceptance in Kentucky; its relative acceptance in Vermont, Maine, New
Hampshire, Georgia and Ohio; and contrasted this record with the doctrine's acceptance in
Massachusetts. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass (14 Allen) 539, 588-91 (1867). Judge Gray
speaking for the Supreme Judicial Court explained the reception in Massachusetts, "The
narrow doctrines which have prevailed in some states upon this subject are inconsistent with
the established law of this commonwealth. Our ancestors brought with them from England the
elements of the law of charitable uses, and, although the form of proceeding by commission
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after the turn of the century and expanded dramatically after World War II.4 Used
as a means to attack discriminatory trust purposes, the doctrine elicited application of
the state action concept in the fifties by the Supreme Court.5 Proposals for reform of
cy pres also began in the fifties6 and continue today, reflecting the current debate
over affirmative action. Interestingly, the proposals for reform correspond to reform

under the St. of 43 Eliz. has never prevailed in Massachusetts, that statute, in substance and
principle, has always been considered as part of our common law." Id. at 591. The court
applied cy pres to the bequest by Francis Jackson to Wendell Phillips and others in trust for
the emancipation of slaves, rendered impossible by the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and ordered that the funds be paid over to the Freedmen's Union Commission, to be used for
the education of the "late slaves." Id. at 599. The court, however, refused to apply the
doctrine to save the bequest to Wendell Phillips et al "to secure the passage of laws granting
women, whether married or unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, manage, and devise
property; and all other civil rights enjoyed by men; . . . ." Id. at 542 (deeming such purposes
not to be charitable). The court commented, citing, inter alia, Habershon v. Vardon, 4 De Gex
& Sm 467, "Gifts for purposes prohibited by or opposed to the existing laws cannot be upheld
as charitable, even if for objects which would otherwise be deemed such." Id. at 555.
4

George Gleason Bogert summarizes the situation before and after 1943. See George
Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 54 MICH. L.
REV. 633 (1954). Generally before 1943, "there was little statutory law in the United States
concerning the supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts." Id. Bogert noted that
"[b]eginning in 1943 a new trend appeared in American statute law with respect to state
supervision of charitable trusts." Id. New Hampshire led the way with Rhode Island, Ohio,
South Carolina, and Texas following, and with the states of Indiana, California, New York,
Florida and Vermont showing interest. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws appointed in 1951 a committee to draft the Uniform Supervision of
Charitable Trusts Act and directed that committee to redraft the act for presentation at the
1954 annual meeting. Id. at 649-50. See also Bogert's suggestions for a model or uniform act.
Id. at 652-58. In 1954, both the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved the Uniform
Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act. Only California, Illinois, Michigan and
Oregon had adopted the Act when, in 1990, the Commission denominated it a model act,
reasoning that it had really been treated by the states in that capacity. See Uniform Laws
Annotated, v. 7B.
5
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of Philadelphia 353 U.S. 230
(1957), wherein the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
which allowed the Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia to refuse to
admit Negroes to a "college" established for poor white males by Stephen Girard's
testamentary trust in 1831. The court found the Board's action to be state action prohibited by
the Fourteenth Amendment, citing Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court held that a park established in
1911 in Macon, Georgia, by Senator Augustus O. Bacon in a testamentary trust for whites
only could no longer be operated as a segregated facility, finding such discrimination violated
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause; Evans v. Abney 396 U.S. 435 (1970),
wherein the Supreme Court allowed to stand the reversion of the trust assets and the
subsequent closing of the park in Macon, Georgia, under the rationale that the cy pres doctrine
could not be applied in the absence of general charitable intent.
6
See Bogert, supra note 4. See also Stuart M. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56
GEO. L. J. 272 (1967) .
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studies commissioned in England.7 In Part I, the author illustrates how the United
States jurisdictions differ from England in the requirement for charitable intent.
Earlier cases reveal the United States, unlike England, has resisted relaxation of the
requirement. In Part II, the author uses the Restatement of Trusts to demonstrate
further how the jurisdictions had developed differently at the mid-twentieth century
point.
In Part III, the author reports on the significant reforms in England and the
corresponding, though halting, movement toward reform in the United States
jurisdictions. In Part IV, the author describes the specific reform proposals in the
United States proliferating since 1943. Finally, the author concludes that relaxation
of cy pres doctrinal requirements is realized best by modest legislation and effective
drafting.
I. THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
In the law of charities, the doctrine of cy-pres was formulated to effectuate a trust
which might otherwise fail. Restatement (Second) of Trusts8 defines the doctrine in
this way:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is, or becomes, impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out
the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general
intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not
fail, but the Court will direct the application of the property to some
charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of
the settlor.
The doctrine has been described as one of "approximation."9 In providing an
alternative charitable purpose, the Courts have read cy pres to mean "as near as
possible" to the declared object.10 The Restatement definition expresses the
American version of the doctrine which differs from English law by requiring that
general charitable intent always be shown before a substitute purpose is applied.
Attempts to formulate a single definition for the cy pres doctrine will prove
impossible because jurisdictional approaches vary as does the historical development
within each jurisdiction, but the Restatement definition expresses the traditional
common law.

7

Parliament repealed the Charitable Trust Acts enacted from 1853 and replaced them with
the Charities Act of 1960, pursuant to the report of The Nathan Committee. See GEORGE W.
KEETON & LIONEL ASTOR SHERIDAN, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES, (2d ed. 1971). The
Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to charitable trusts known as The
Nathan Report was presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament in 1952. A subsequent
report published in 1987, known as the Woodfield Report, resulted from a commission by the
British Home Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury of Sir Philip Woodfield to
review the work of the Commissioners under the 1960 act. The latter report suggested that
some relaxation of the cy pres doctrine might be advisable. See fuller discussion infra.
8

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1958).

9

In re Kensington Hospital for Women, A. 2d. 154 (Pa. 1948).

10

KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 135.
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The English use of the doctrine contrasts sharply with its practice in the United
States. The English have applied the cy pres doctrine in cases where the donor,
testator, or settlor has expressed a general charitable intention and, in other instances,
where no general charitable intention has been manifested. Professors George W.
Keeton and L. A. Sheridan summarized the requirement for a general charitable
intent in English Law:
A general charitable intent must be shown:
1. Where the purpose indicated by the testator is impossible or illegal;
2. Where the purpose has never existed;
3. Where the object has existed but ceases to exist before the testator's
death.
A general charitable intent need not be shown:
1. Where the purpose or institution ceases to exist after the gift has taken
effect.
2. Where a charity comes to an end because the object for which it was
established has ceased to exist, or has come to an end for some other
reason;
3. Where the machinery for the application of the gift fails;
4. Where, after providing for the particular object, there is a surplus of
charitable funds.11
Professors L. A. Sheridan and V. T. H. Delany, emphasizing this difference,
pointed out that "except in most parts of the United States, the absence of a general
charitable intent is not fatal to a cy-pres application."12 They defined general
charitable intent as an intent to benefit any or a type of charity, however narrow or
unlimited, which is wide enough to include the stated (impossible) purpose.13 To
find general charitable intent, the terms of the gift will be taken into account as will
the place of the gift in the instrument, whether the gift is surrounded by other
charitable gifts, or if the disposition is in favour of an organization which has never
existed.14 All pertinent facts relating to the formation of the gift may be considered
by the court.15 The rationale behind the requirement of general intent is grounded in
the historical insistence in trust law that courts respect trustor intent and in the
reluctance of courts to re-write the trust instrument.
Cases from the early 1900's illustrate the traditional approach to cy pres used in
the United States. In the 1929 case, Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v.
Williams,16 the testatrix made a bequest to the Bristol Cottage Hospital which was in
11

Id. at 134-35; see also GEORGE W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 171 (9 ed. 1971).

12

LIONEL ASTOR SHERIDAN & VINCENT THOMAS HYGINUS DELANY, THE CY-PRES
DOCTRINE, 33 (1st ed. 1959).
13

Id. at 36.

14

For a thorough discussion of charitable intent, see Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency
and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes Doctrine, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1341, 1348-51
(1995).
15

See Vanessa Laird, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the
Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973 (1988).
16

148 A. 189 (R.I. 1929).
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existence when the will was executed, but ceased to exist before the death of the
testatrix. Judge Barrow described the task before the court, "The difficult problem in
this type of case
is to ascertain whether the charitable intention of the testatrix
was specific only, or if the dominant intent was of a general charitable nature so that
it may be made effective cy-pres."17 The court found that the testatrix had a
"dominant purpose to devote the residue of her estate to general charities of the type
represented" by its successor, and applied the gift cy pres.18
In construing the will to find the testatrix's intent, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court emphasized the fact that other charities were named together in the residuary
clause and the fact that the Bristol Cottage Hospital had been an active charity at the
time the testatrix executed her will. These facts were sufficient to allow the court to
find an interest in the general charitable project of a cottage hospital and to order the
charitable funds accordingly.
In the 1920 case, Bancroft v. Maine State Sanitorium Association,19 the Maine
court noted: “The general principle running through all the cases is that, in order to
apply the cy-pres doctrine, there must be two pre-requisites: first, a failure of the
specific object; and, second, a general charitable intent disclosed in the instrument
creating the trust.”20
The gift in Bancroft failed because the court could not find a general charitable
intent. The object of the gift was a charitable tuberculosis sanitorium which had
been turned over to the State. Although the instrument provided for forfeiture under
certain conditions with a gift over to specified persons, the fact that the association to
whom the gift was made ceased to hold the sanitorium was not within the scope of
the forfeiture clause. The court, finding no general charitable intention, ruled that
the trust should fail.
A general charitable intent is consistently required throughout the states in which
the doctrine had been judicially adopted, and in most of the states statutorily
adopting cy pres.21 However, a recent Connecticut case has been criticized as
precedent for completely doing away with the requirement of testator intent under
the Connecticut version of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act.22
17

Id. at 190.

18

Id. at 192.

19

109 A. 585 (Me. 1920).

20

Id. at 592.

21

See generally 4A Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of
Trusts § 399, 476, (4th ed. 1989).
22
Andrew C. Kruger, Are Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of Cy Pres Alive After Yale
University v. Blumenthal? 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 241 (1994) (discussing the effect of the
Connecticut Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act on the doctrine of cy pres).
Kruger notes that some thirty-six states have adopted similar statutes patterned on the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act which may give the holding "national implications
regarding a limitation on a testator's 'deadhand' control." Id. at 242. When Thomas F.
Smallman died in 1928, he left $ 225,000.00 in trust, life income to his wife with remainder at
her death to Yale College for construction of a sick poor wing at the Yale Medical School.
The funds in 1987 at the death of Jane Smallman were insufficient to construct such a wing
and Yale sought and received permission from the Connecticut Supreme Court to use the
funds to benefit the medical school as a part of the school's institutional fund. The court did
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Only Pennsylvania has legislation which eliminates the requirement of finding
general charitable intent before applying cy pres,23 although Massachusetts has
liberally extended the cy pres doctrine by creating a statutory presumption of general
charitable intent "unless otherwise provided in a written instrument of gift."24
Courts in England do not invariably require both failure and general charitable
intent before applying the doctrine. The doctrine in theory requires an initial finding
that the specific object of the trust fail. The failure may result from an impossibility,
impracticability or illegality, and the facts of each case determine whether the
purpose fails. English decisions distinquish between initial impossibility and
supervening or subsequent impossibility when requiring a general intent.25
In the 1923 case of Carlisle County v. Norris,26 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
refused to apply the doctrine. Norris conveyed property outright to be held in trust
as a public burial ground. In addition to the initial conveyance of thirty acres of
land, he conveyed an additional tract at a later date and, at another time, deposited
five thousand dollars, income and profit to be used by the trustees for improving the
property. At yet a later date, he placed another five thousand dollars with the
trustees for the same purpose. After ten years had passed with no sales of cemetery
lots, Norris brought an action to recover the assets, alleging that the trust purpose had
failed because of the public's refusal to accept the grounds. The court did not
examine the question of general charitable intent, but emphasized the impossiblity of
obtaining the object of the trust. The court invoked public policy to find that the
funds should not be allowed to remain dormant, ruled that the trust had terminated,
and returned the trust funds to the donor.27
The English courts would not follow the result in the Norris case. In cases of
subsequent impossibility, two possible resolutions can be made by the English
courts. A resulting trust may be declared or the application of the funds may be
applied cy pres.28 Because impossibility is determined at the time the gift is made,
this case should be considered a case of subsequent impossibility. The conveyance
in Norris, however, was unconditional and was, therefore, an "out-and-out" gift.29 In
England, it is well settled that upon a supervening impossibility, an out-and-out gift
not reach the question of intent. Although Yale worked out an agreement with the Conneticut
Attorney General which recited "approximation" with the donor's intent, it did so without
court direction. The precedent "could be interpreted as Yale apparently initially sought, to
remove consideration of testator intent from a charitable gift." Id. at 248.
23

20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110 (a) (West 1996).

24

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 8K, as inserted by Laws 1974, c.562. The statutes also
provide that persons who might stand to take from the deceased's trust need not be noticed
when a petition for cy pres is filed, except in certain cases. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
214, § 10B, as inserted by Laws 1974, c.562.
25

See KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 145-55; see also Lionel Astor Sheridan,
Cy-pres in the Sixties: Judicial Activity, 6 ALBERTA L. REV. 16, 23 (1968).
26

254 S.W. 1044 (Ky. 1923),

27

Id. at 1046.

28

KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 155.

29

SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 102.
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is applied cy-pres,30 and in cases of initial impossibility of an out-and-out gift, the
majority of the English courts apply cy pres.31 In trusts failing after the charitable
object has attached, the courts do not require a general charitable intent before
applying cy pres.32 The result would apparently be the same in cases involving trusts
established by an out-and-out gift whose purpose fails either initially or
subsequently. These rules indicate that an English court would decide the Norris
case differently, whether the impossibility is construed as initial or supervening,
emphasizing the character of the gift as an out-and-out gift, rather than the
requirement of general charitable intent.33
II. COMPARISON USING THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts appeared in 1957, replacing the 1935
version. As an expression of the then current common law of trusts, the Restatement
allows an intelligible comparison between the use of cy pres in the United States and
in England and helps to clarify some differences between the jurisdictions. It is clear
from the Restatement (Second) of Trusts34 that courts in the United States emphasize
the requirement of a general charitable intention regardless of whether the failure is
considered to be initial or subsequent. The courts more readily apply the cy pres
doctrine when the particular purpose "fails at some time after the creation of the trust
than
when the particular purpose fails at the outset" because "it is easier to find a
more charitable intention of the settlor."35
The Restatement and the English courts treat the application of surplus funds
differently although a surplus has been defined as "after all, nothing but the most
frequent instance of impossibility (usually supervening, occasionally initial). . . ."36
Under the Restatement:
30

Id.

31

In Beggs v. Kirkpatrick V.R. 764, 767 (1961), Justice Adam said "it appears that without
there being any general charitable intention, a gift made solely for a particular charitable
purpose although it has failed ab initio, will be administered cy-pres if the gift was an
out-and-out gift -- the donor having abandoned all interest in it." Sheridan, supra note 25, at
24.
32

See Sheridan, supra note 25, at 24-26.

33

The English courts would also have avoided the reversion of the park in Macon, Georgia
to the heirs of Senator Augustus O. Bacon. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). The trust
provided a life estate for Bacon's daughters and wife with a remainder to the city of Macon for
the operation of a segregated park. In his dissent, Justice Douglas stressed that Bacon left "all
remainders and reversions and every estate in the same of whatsoever kind" to Macon. Id. at
448. In dissent, Justice Brennan also noted that Macon bought the life interests from the life
tenants in 1920. Id. at 451. These facts, although argued by the dissenters to establish state
action, also unmistakenly imply that Bacon's gift was an out-and-out gift, to which the English
courts would have applied cy pres.
34

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. i (1959).

35

But see SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 104-07; Sheridan, supra note 25 at 26,
where the author points out that it is particularly easy to prove general charitable intent when a
testator has given property to a named institution which never existed.
36

SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 115-16.
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If property is given upon trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and the purpose is fully accomplished without exhausting the
trust property, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the whole of the trust property to charitable purposes, there will
not be a resulting trust of the surplus but the court will direct the
application of the surplus to some charitable purpose which falls within
the general charitable intention of the settlor.37
Comments to the Restatement make clear that a general charitable intention is
required to apply the surplus funds cy pres. The English judges, however, "speak
with discordant voices as to any requirement of intention."38 The Restatement39
indicates that money bequeathed to the completion and publication of a dictionary
which is over and above the amount required shall be applied to a resulting trust.
The rule directly conflicts with the English decision in In re King.40 Money
specifically designated for the installation and maintenance of a stained glass
memorial window in a Church at Urchester resulted in a surplus which the courts
applied cy pres for the installation of similar windows in the church.41 No general
charitable intention was shown or required by the court for the application of cy
pres.42
The Restatement notes one exception to the requirement. In cases where
property is given to a charitable corporation to be applied to one of the purposes of
the corporation and there is a surplus, the court may apply the surplus cy pres to the
other charitable purposes of the corporation unless the settlor has specifically
provided for the surplus in the instrument.43
An out-and-out gift as a charitable subscription will generally be enforced in
England, regardless of intent. This principle was followed by Justice Danckwerts in
In re Wokingham Fire Brigade Trusts.44 Subscriptions were taken to maintain the
Wokingham Fire Brigade which was later transferred to the National Fire Service, "I
think that the subscribers intended to part with all interest in the subscriptions when
they made them for the benefit of this public purpose. [I]t is not necessary to
consider whether there was any general charitable intention and the trust should be
modified by means of a cy-pres application."45 This approach differs from the
Restatement which provides:
37

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400 (1959).

38
KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 159. See also cases collected in Sheridan &
Delany, supra note 12, at 115, nn.1,3.
39

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400, cmt. b (1959).

40

1 Ch. 243 (1923).

41

Id. at 246.

42

Id.

43

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400, cmt. c (1959). Of course, in cases where the
donor has provided for a gift over, the question of general charitable intent and, consequently,
that of cy pres should not arise.
44

1951 Ch. 373, 377.

45

Id.
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If several persons contribute to a fund to be applied to a particular
charitable purpose, and the purpose is fully accomplished without
exhausting the trust property, and the doctrine of cy-pres is not applicable,
a resulting trust of the surplus will arise in favour of the contributors who
will be entitled to share it in proportion to their contribution. If some of
the contributors cannot be ascertained there will be a resulting trust of
their shares to the State.46
Thus, in the absence of a showing of a general charitable intent on subscription of
fund, the cy pres doctrine would not apply and a resulting trust to either the
subscriber or the state would follow. The result should be the same in either case
involving surplus: 1. where the purpose has become impossible to achieve, and 2.
where the purpose has been achieved and there is a surplus.47
The British decision in In re Ulverston and District New Hospital Building
Trust48 closely paralleled the rationale of the Restatement comment. Funds were
raised for a new hospital at Ulverston, but the enactment of the National Health
Services Act of 1946 obviated the necessity for the hospital. The court declared that
the money should be returned to the original donors in a resulting trust. For those
donors who were unidentifiable, the court declared that they should be treated as
bona vacantia, and the funds were passed to the Crown.49
Aside from uneven statutory modifications, application of cy pres in the United
States was summarized in 1959 as follows:50
1. In cases of impossibility or surplus where there is a general charitable intent,
there will be a cy-pres application by the court.
2. In cases of impossibility or surplus, where there is no general charitable
intent, there will be no cy-pres application. A resulting trust ensues unless
the gift was out-and-out when the property will go as on a failure of
successors.
3. Where there is a general charitable gift, with no object or insufficient details
specified, the property will go as selected by the trustee appointed for the
purpose or if necessary by the court.
4. There is no executive power of cy-pres application.
III. THE OLD FACE OF REFORM: IMPLEMENTING TESTATOR INTENT
Development of the doctrine of cy pres in England proceeded both statutorily and
judicially, beginning in the seventeenth century.51 In the United States, judicial
development was slow, with codification beginning in the mid-twentieth century.
American courts usually construed the doctrine strictly and narrowly, and by the
46

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400 cmt. d (1959).

47

KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 150.

48

1 W.L.R. 1260, 2 ALL E.R. 1032, 97 S.J. 728 (1953).

49

Contra, In re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund (1958) Ch. 300 England; Charities Act,
1960, § 14. The Charities Act of 1960 provided for a cy pres application in similar fact
situations, rendering Ulverston obsolete.
50

SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 45.

51

See KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 135-36.
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1950's, reformers called for supervision of charities and reform of the cy pres
doctrine.52
In England, supervisory power is conferred upon the Charity Commissioners or,
in the case of educational endowments, upon the Ministry of Education, subject in
both cases to appeal to the courts.53 The Charity Act of 1860 gave the Charity
Commissioners power concurrent with the Chancery Division to establish or modify
schemes within the limits of the cy pres doctrine. The Endowed Schools Act of 1869
removed power for educational trusts to an independent commission and these
powers became part of the Board of Education in 1899 and are now vested in the
Department of Education.54
The Charities Act of 1960, passed in response to the Report of the Nathan
Committee of 1952, was evaluated by the Woodfield Report of 1987.55 Although the
Woodfield Report indicated that the cy pres doctrine might need to be "redefined in
statute in a rather looser way, or relaxations introduced specifically for small
charities,"56 the committee report recommended only that "[t]he Commission should
consult widely on possible ways of relaxing the cy pres doctrine and advise the
Home Secretary whether legislation would be desirable."57 Responding to this
recommendation, the government determined that "legislation would not be
appropriate," that it would in fact be "undesirable," and that the evolution of the
traditional doctrine under existing law was preferable.58
The Nathan Committee's proposals as they applied to the doctrine of cy pres also
can be briefly summarized. The Committee considered relaxation of the cy pres
doctrine along two main lines: a) relaxation of the need for impossibility and b)
relaxation of the nearest rule, i.e. the rule that a cy pres application must be to an
object as near as possible to the one whose impracticable nature has given rise to the
cy pres jurisdiction.59
The Nathan Report, basically repeating the Reports of the Charity Commisioners
who continually argued for greater cy pres application in their annual reports,60
prompted legislation. The requirement for impossibility was relaxed in response to
52

Supra note 4.

53

GEORGE W. KEETON, MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAW OF CHARITIES 303 (1971).

54

Id. at 304. See SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 45.

55

For a more detailed discussion of the recommendations of the Woodfield Report, see
Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 Hast. L. J. 1111, 1156-57 n. 5 (1993). See also
Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of Charities, Report to the Home Secretary and the
Economic Secretary to the Treasury by Sir Philip Woodfield, KCB, CBE, Graham Binns,
Richard Hirst and David Neal, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1987, § 83-85, 31-32.
56

See Woodfield Report § 85 at 32.

57

See Recommendation 27 at 32.

58

See Atkinson, supra note 55, at 1156 n. 5. The Charities Act of 1992 made specific
provisions for small charities, but left the doctrine relatively intact. Also, section two of the
Charities Act of 1985 provided specifically for local charities for poverty relief. See
Woodfield Report § 83.
59

KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 7, at 304.

60

Id. at 165-75.
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the Report. Part III, section 13 of the Charity Act of 1960 reflects these changes by
providing:
a) Where the original purposes in whole or in part:
i. have been as far as may be fulfilled; or
ii. cannot be carried out, or not according to the directions given and to
the spirit of the gift; or
b) Where the original purposes provide a use for part only of the property
available by virtue of the gift; or
c) where the property available by virtue of the gift and other property
applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in
conjunction, and to that end can suitably, egard being had to the spirit of
the gift, be made applicable to common purposes; or
d) where the original purposes were laid down by reference to an area
which then was but has since ceased to be a unit for some other purpose,
or by reference to a class of persons or to an area which has for any
reason since ceased to be suitable, regard being had to the spirit of the
gift, or to be practical in administering the gift; or
e) where the original purposes, in a whole or in part, have, since they were
laid down:
(i)
been adequately provided for by other means; or
(ii)
ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community or for
other reasons, to be in law charitable, or
(iii)
ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective
method of using the property available by virtue of the gift,
regard being had to the spirit of the gift.61
The relaxation of the "nearest" rule is accomplished through section 13(d) of the
Charities Act where the altered scheme is required to be within the spirit of the gift.
Section 14 extended the application of cy pres to surplus gifts resulting from donees
who are unknown or disclaiming.
Professor Sheridan noted "there had been no relaxation of the requirement of
impossibility in countries without legislation."62 The Charities Act of 1960 made it
incumbent on the trustee to apply cy pres or to take steps to enable it to be so
applied, under the relaxed rule in part III, section 13.
If relaxation of the cy pres doctrine is, in fact, "the key to a more rational law of
charities,"63 jurisdictions in the United States are still learning the lesson. Judicially,
a more liberal approach to the enforcement of charities is desirable; but, if the
English trend is followed, relaxation will come by legislation. The initial reluctance
of the United States courts to accept the cy pres doctrine was being addressed by the
1950's via statutory enactments.64 A growing awareness of the deficiencies in
charitable trusts enforcement65 spearheaded legislative interest. When the Nathan
61

Id. at 271 (appendix I).

62

L. A. Sheridan, Cy-pres in the Sixties: Judicial Activity, 6 Alberta Law Review 16, 20
(1968).
63

KEETON, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS lst ed., 307.

64

See Bogert, supra, note 4 for a summary of the enactments.

65

Scott on Trusts, § 391; SHERIDAN AND DELANY, THE CY-PRES DOCTRINE 16-17, n. 88.
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Report was published in 1952, George Gleason Bogert analyzed the report in his
appeal for charity legislation and pointed out the reluctance in the states to legislate
on public charities and to respond generally to the problems of public charities
administration. In 1968, Professor Sheridan, confirming the obvious, noted that the
American courts were reluctant to apply the cy pres doctrine "where it ha[d] not been
specifically introduced or confirmed by statute."66
Two doctrines, the prerogative use of cy pres and the equitable approximation
doctrine, have further confused the use of cy pres in the United States. Courts
initially had difficulty accepting the cy pres doctrine because of its association with
the royal prerogative.67 The prerogative power is expressly denounced in United
States as reflected in the Restatement:
The prerogative power does not exist in the United States; it cannot be
exercised even by the legislature, although the legislature can enact
general rules as to the extent and the exercise of the judicial power of the
courts to apply cy pres to property which is given for charitable
purposes.68
Under the prerogative cy pres, the Crown directed the application of the fund to
some charitable purpose when the original purpose failed.69 The arbitrary use of the
doctrine and its association with the monarchy made even the use of judicial cy pres
suspect.
As an alternative to cy pres, American courts also applied, without clearly
distinguishing between the two, the doctrine of equitable approximation. The
doctrine of equitable approximation is based on the rationale that the intent of the
settlor in a private or charitable trust should be saved from frustration of purpose.
When necessary to preserve the purpose, equity will allow a variation in the
administration of the trust. The case of Smith v. Moore,70 illustrates the confusion in
the law of Virginia over adoption of cy pres and the United States Court of Appeals’
use of equitable approximation to “resolve” this confusion, while, at the same time,
confusing equitable approximation with cy pres.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia applied cy pres to save a
bequest made by a decedent who had died before the 1946 Virginia statute formally
adopted the cy pres doctrine.71 On appeal, the heirs argued that cy pres was not a part
of the law of Virginia before 1946. They relied on Chief Justice John Marshall's
opinion in Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors72 that cy pres was not
66

Sheridan, supra note 25, at 16.

67

See SHERIDAN & DELANY, supra note 12, at 24; Sheridan, supra note 25, at 16-18 &

n.88.
68

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. h (1959).

69

The most egregious use of prerogative cy pres occurred in Da Costa v. De Pas, 27 Eng.
Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754). The trust created by a Jewish testator for religious instructions to those
of the Jewish faith was applied cy pres by the Crown toward the support a Christian minister’s
in giving instructions in the Christian faith. The initial purpose was illegal.
70

225 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff’d, 343 F.2d 594 (1965).

71

Moore, 225 F. Supp. at 434.

72

17 U.S.(4 Wheat)1 (1819).
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an inherent power of the equity courts. The Court of Appeals noted that: “Virginia,
having been one of the original states and thus having its laws enunciated under the
influence of John Marshall, is in the mainstream of the confusion, contradiction and
equivocation attaching to the history of the doctrine of cy pres in America.”73
The appeals court refused to decide the issue of whether cy pres had been
adopted in Virginia as part of the common law or only by the 1946 statute. The
court found "it unnecessary to decide because of the doctrine of equitable
approximation"74 which allowed the court to substitute a hospital wing for a building,
a clinic for a hospital and a hospital corporation as title holder instead of the trustee
named by the decedent. The court noted that the results which are obtained under
the cy pres doctrine had been accomplished equally well by the application of
equitable approximation. Properly understood, however, the doctrine of equitable
approximation, known also as administrative deviation, is not an alternative to cy
pres. Under administrative deviation, a court may vary the administrative directives
of a trust when changed circumstances require. Cy pres deals only with ultimate
purpose, not with procedural efficiency.75
IV. THE NEWER FACE OF REFORM: IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY
Calls for reform of the cy pres doctrine in the years following 1943 have been
both doctrinally and politically oriented. The use of cy pres to reach private
discriminatory gifts focused initially on discrimination against race and moved to
other forms of discrimination including gender. Thirty years have passed since
Professor Stuart M. Nelkin of the University of Houston School of Law urged the
use of "the Fourteenth amendment as a vehicle for 'social engineering' despite the
absence of 'formal' state involvement."76 Professor Nelkin advocated a bold use of
the cy pres doctrine to insure that the government policy of non-discrimination
announced in Brown v. Board of Education77 would move forward. Discussing
Shelley v. Kraemer78 and its precedential value to reach private acts of
discrimination, Nelkin argued that there was an affirmative state duty to guarantee
equal protection and concluded that the "artificial and ambiguous state action
doctrine"79 should be discarded, along with "charitable trusts exclusively for one
race."80 He applied, however, different considerations for "charitable trusts

73

Moore, 343 F.2d at 599.

74

Id. at 600.

75

The confusion continues. See Matter of the Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (1983),
discussed infra. For a more detailed discussion of the doctrines of cy pres and administrative
deviation, see Chris Abbinante, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 665 (1997).
76

See Stuart M. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating Look
at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 Geo. L. J. 272, 313 (1967).
77

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

78

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

79

Nelkin, supra note 76, at 272, 312.

80

Id. at 313.
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exclusively for Negroes,"81 reasoning that such trusts should be upheld if the purpose
was to "close the gap between whites and Negroes."82 Nelkin noted that "[i]deally, at
some later date, all charities with racial overtones will be unenforceable."83
Nelkin's article was followed a decade later by an article from Professor Elias
Clark of Yale Law School,84 hailing the Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v.
Board of Directors85 as the "first step toward desegregation of charitable trusts."86
The Supreme Court decided the case under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection clause finding state action. Clark, however, recognized the additional
dimension that cy pres could bring to solve the problem of discriminatory trusts.
The settlor is assumed to have been an intelligent and responsible citizen.
Had he foreseen the future course of public policy, it is argued, he would
not have intended his limitation to continue. The reasoning has the virtue
of accomplishing the public purpose within the framework of the settlor's
intent. Here, again, the traditions of judicial restraint often foreclose
sensible solution. If cy pres may properly be applied to a trust, the court
will not hesitate to manufacture, in the settlor's name, a use for the funds
more compatible with contemporary community values.87
Clark realized that the requirement of a general charitable intent would have to be
solved in each case, unless the lead of Pennsylvania could be followed.88 "It has
been suggested that Pennsylvania, having recently enacted a statute which eliminates
the requirement of general charitable intent, may now give greater consideration to
the public welfare."89 Clark also recognized the problem of using the Fourteenth
Amendment to solve "the delicate problems of discrimination."90
Were the Ford Foundation to disperse its millions on a discriminatory
basis, society would find the result intolerable. On the other hand, a trust
to educate poor children of a minority race seems useful and worthy of
community approval. Yet they are of the same stuff, and when the
question is limited to the presence or absence of state action, they
seemingly stand or fall together.91

81

Id.

82

Id. at 314.

83

Id.

84

See Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 Yale L. J. 979 (1957).
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353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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Clark, supra note 84.
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Id. at 1000.
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Id.
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Id. at 1000 & n. 81. This has not happened.
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Id.
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Id. at 1009-10.
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Clark stopped short of calling for social engineering, but he highlighted the
context within which reformers would work. They would have to strike a balance
between the private right to control one's own property and the public right to
charitable assets.92 Clark noted also that the "maliciously discriminatory trust is only
of peripheral importance. To the relatively few now in existence, the addition of
many more is unlikely."93
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments for affirmative social engineering in
the 1970 case of Evans v. Abney.94 Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
reasoned that "freedom of testation . . . has its advantages and disadvantages."
Freedom of testation dictated that Baconsfield, a park created with specific intent to
discriminate, revert to the testator's heirs. Black upheld the Georgia court's refusal to
apply cy pres to integrate the park, noting that the Court would not "legislate social
policy on the basis of . . . personal inclinations."95
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Evans v. Newton,96 finding that the park
could no longer be operated as segregated because parks serve a public function, and
the Black opinion in Abney, finding no state action in Georgia's use of the cy pres
doctrine, defined the continuing debate about state involvement in discriminatory
trusts. The opinions also highlight the unpredictability associated with the state
action concept and the entanglement and public functions exceptions by which
individual discrimination can be reached.97 The dissents of Justices Black, Harlan,
and Stewart in Newton and of Justices Douglas and Brennan in Abney add contours
to the discourse which remains substantially unchanged. Justice Black argued that
state judicial action must affirmatively enforce "a private scheme of discrimination"
to be proscribed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.98
Justice Brennan found "state action in overwhelming abundance"99 and insisted that
the facts supported a finding of significant state involvement which made
enforcement of the reverter unconstitutional.
Following the 1983 New York case, Matter of the Estate of Wilson,100 calls for
reform again proliferated. In Wilson, two cases with similar trust distribution

92

Id. at 1014-15. Clark also expressed the hope that after a period of time, the courts
might not need to use cy pres to invalidate discriminatory trusts.
93

Id. at 980.
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396 U.S. 435 (1970).

95

Id. at 447.
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382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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See Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich.
L. Rev. 213 (1991) for an analysis of the Supreme Court's application of the state action
concept in a broader context. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles
and Policies 385-417 (1997).
98

396 U.S. at 445. Black reasoned that Senator Bacon's private act of discrimination is not
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment because it is not state action.
99

Id. at 455.

100

452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983).
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provisions were consolidated.101 The New York Appeals Court reviewed the
provisions which discriminated against women, and found that the exercise of cy
pres was inappropriate. The court used the mechanism of administrative deviation to
save the trusts.102 Reasoning that the intent of both testators to benefit education103 of
males should not be frustrated by the provisions which required state action to
administer the funds, the court affirmed the appointment of private trustees to replace
the public officials who were refusing to serve.104
The court reasoned that the gender provisions were not illegal and refused to
accept a per se rule that gender restrictions were contrary to public policy. In doing
so, the court announced that it accepted the concept, advanced by the "current
thinking in private philanthropic institutions,"105 that charitable gifts should serve the
needs of particular groups, and concluded that the "focusing of private philantropy
on certain classes within society may be consistent with public policy."106 The New
York court relaxed the impossibility requirement and elected to apply administrative
deviation to save the trust purposes. In announcing its opinion, the court recognized
the value of a trust set up for gender purposes which would, in this case, benefit men,
but which could, in other cases, benefit women.
Current reformers who advocate weighing public policy heavily against the
testator's intent perceive the court's policy-making function as primary, urging
judicial activism to further public policy agenda.107 In a 1989 article, Mark Petrucci
argued that courts should "rethink their cy pres approach and start to give more
weight to the public policy issues involved."108 Petrucci advanced an "if then" test.
Treating testator intent and public policy as "co-equals," the court should search for a
general charitable intent. If one is found, the court should remove the discriminatory
provisions of the trust. If one is not found, the court should "allow the trust to be
destroyed."109
The Petrucci proposal differs from the charitable trust anti-discrimination statute
proposed by Steven Swanson.110 Swanson's proposal is based on the Race Relations
101
Id. at 1228. In the Matter of Wilson, the testator's trust provided first year college
expenses to five young men whose names were to be certified by the Superintendent of
Schools. Id. at 1231. In the Matter of Johnson, the Board of Education and the high school
Principal were charged with selecting deserving male students to receive educational benefits
under the Johnson trust. Id.
102

59 N.E.2d 461, 474-75.

103

Id. at 472.

104

Id. at 480.

105

Id., at 473-74.
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Id., at 474.

107
See Mark Petrucci, The Cy Pres Doctrine - Is It State Action?, 18 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383
(1989).
108

Id. at 411.

109

Id.
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Steven R. Swanson, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts: Time for a Legislative Solution,
48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 153 (1986).
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Act [of] 1976 passed by the United Kingdom.111 Swanson’s statute forbids
discrimination, except in situations where the discriminatory provisions would
remedy past discrimination.112
Petrucci criticized Swanson’s proposal as an affirmative action statute, "This is
not an area where affirmative action will work. To allow someone to set up a
discriminatory trust (one wrong) to redress a past discrimination (another wrong) is
not logical."113
Many of the current calls for cy pres reform appear in the guise of "charitable
efficiency" arguments.114 Decrying the vise in which reformers currently find
themselves, pressed on one side by "deference to dead hand control" and on the other
by "undefined standards of charitable efficiency,"115 Professor Rob Atkinson,
relying on the Woodfield Report's suggestion for small charities,116 called for giving
trustees virtually unlimited power to manage assets in the way they decide "would
most advance the public good."117 Under his plan, the trustee would be limited only
by "what the state defines as charitable through common law, legislation, or
administrative regulation, as well as by extralegal mechanisms to enforce donor
intent."118 Atkinson proposed the "sectarian approach" as an attempt to steer between
the "liberal individualism underlying 'pure' cy pres" and the "communitarianism
underlying" efforts concentrating on the public good.119 Atkinson, by transferring
discretion from the courts and granting extensive decision-making to the trustee,
substantially reduced recourse to the courts and created a wide area for possible
abuse, as well as virtual negation of donor intent.

111

See the statute which inspired Swanson's proposal. Id. at 188.

112

Id. at 190-91.

113

Petrucci, supra note 107, at 409.
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See Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the
Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 Va. L. Rev. 635 (1988), responding to the California decision in In re
Estate of Beryl H. Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986). See also John G. Simon,
American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. Rev. 641 (1987). Calls for reform of
the doctrine are usually sparked by a case in which application of the doctrine is criticized.
For a convincing argument favoring donor intent and criticizing the efficiency arguments
surrounding In re Barnes, see Chris Abbinante, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable
Foundations: Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 665
(1997). Abbinante argues that "an additional legal hurdle should be erected to protect donor
intent . . . a rebuttable presumption against permitting any type of deviation from the intent of
the donor, administrative or purposive, which can be overcome only when the trustee makes a
showing of indisputable need." Id. at 705.
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By 1998, Atkinson, admitting that it was not "entirely wise,"120 no longer
advanced the model as a "universal and mandatory alternative to . . . dead-hand
control . . . and its corollary, the cy pres doctrine."121 Atkinson recognized that a
donor creates "an explicitly sectarian organization" when he gives unlimited
discretion to trustees to apply funds when purposes fail. He now argues for a
"flexible presumption . . . in favor of fiduciary discretion."122 The presumption is
applicable only "to particular kinds of charity" and can be rebutted "only by the
donor's explicit contrary reservation."123 Atkinson reasoned that this "flexible
presumption of donor intent would function much like a liberalized cy pres rule."124
V. CONCLUSION
The various calls for cy pres reform in the United States inevitably favor either
donor intent or public policy. Courts must engage in a balancing test when
reviewing a trust which discriminates, understanding the reality that discrimination,
either benign or invidious, is inherent in charitable giving. Invidious discrimination
involving state action is, of course, illegal, and will not be allowed. Under the cy
pres doctrine, however, the question in each case where the trust purpose has failed
and a general charitable intent has been established becomes whether the trust fund
will be applied to the next nearest purpose or whether the trust itself will fail.
Traditionally, the courts in the United States have decided in favor of donor intent,
even when to do so has resulted in trust forfeiture. If this practice continues, and
history indicates that it will, the Massachusetts model, respecting tradition but
recognizing the need for reform, presents a workable answer to the problem of
discriminatory trusts. The statute creates a presumption of general charitable intent
which can be rebutted by a writing memorializing the donor's particular intent.125
Astute drafting should allow the donor purposefully to retain or relinquish control
over the funds, and thus to guide the courts in application of the cy pres doctrine.
Should he elect to create the "sectarian organization" encouraged by Professor
Atkinson, the donor will inadvertently participate in the progressive development of
the cy pres doctrine.
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Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
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traditional requirement. See Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over: The Search for
Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 41 (1989).
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